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Abstract
This thesis primarily describes performance and decision heuristics of human opera-
tors intervention with an autonomous formation flight (AFF) system during monitor-
ing of a station-keeping display. Due to mental and physical workloads, automation
technologies have been applied to formation flight for precise station-keeping and
resultant fuel reduction, shifting control authority from humans to machines. Ac-
cordingly, the human is not directly in the control loop, but just supervises whether
or not the automation works as intended. One critical problem in AFF supervi-
sory control is that the human pilot needs to intervene with AFF system when the
automated systems malfunction or their functions degrade. Thus while monitoring
a station-keeping display, operators should minimize incorrect decisions for safety
and cost reduction. To examine design issues in such a display, a simulation was con-
structed that simulated two different control systems as well as the impact of different
angles of bank.
20 subjects participated in the monitoring task simulation of the station-keeping
display. During the experiments, subjects were asked to intervene with AFF system
when the AFF system failed to keep the trailing aircraft in the vortex area. Subjects
made the most incorrect decisions when the AFF system was operated with the oscil-
lating controller and high angle of bank. Trust of the human in the AFF system was
found to be influenced by the damping ratio of the AFF controller. Most significantly,
results showed that humans developed biased decision criteria to execute interven-
tions because velocity feedback of the wing tip on this display was not adequately
provided.
Thesis Supervisor: Mary (Missy) L. Cummings
Title: Boeing Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Autonomous Formation Flight
For thousands of years, birds have realized aerodynamic benefits by flying in for-
mation. Migratory birds such as Canadian geese fly in large formations, allowing
the leading bird to create vortices in which the trailing (wingman) birds can reduce
energy consumption. For example, great white pelicans appear to beat their wings
less frequently and to glide for longer periods when flying in formation at optimal
positions. The total energy savings that can be achieved is 11.4~14.0%, which is cal-
culated from measuring the heart rate of the pelicans [28]. Figure 1-1 illustrates the
V formation flight of migratory birds.
In a manner similar to migration birds, flying aircraft in formation can take ad-
vantage of the vortex created by the wing of the leading aircraft. An aircraft wing
generates strong wing tip vortex, which causes an upwash field. By properly position-
ing a trailing aircraft within the vortices, aerodynamic benefit is achieved, especially
for long-range missions. To reduce fuel expenditure in formation flight, aircraft should
be positioned relatively close both laterally and longitudinally [2]. Scientists, using
vortex lattice code HASC95, predicted a drag reduction of just over 20%. In attempt
to verify theory, researchers examined how much benefit could be obtained through
13
Figure 1-1: Formation Flight of Birds [22]
station-keeping by a two-ship T-38 formation flight. Experimental results indicated
a 15% drag reduction for the trail aircraft and an 11% fuel flow reduction. How-
ever, during the tests, it was discovered the maximum duration the pilots could keep
the position was approximately 20~30 minutes [1], because manual formation flight
increases physical and mental workload of pilots.
Autonomous formation flight testing (AFF) was recently completed at the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Cen-
ter. As opposed to the two T-38s test, two F-18 aircraft mounted with Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS) maintained the formation for 96 minutes with autopilot.
Researchers measured drag reduction up to 20% for short intervals. The trail F-18
aircraft demonstrated a 12% fuel savings relative to the lead F-18 on the final test
flight. It was also observed the pilots experienced high mental and physical workload
increase even in the AFF[8, 27]. Figure 1-2 shows two F-18 aircraft in autonomous
formation flight.
The implications and applications of AFF technology will be far reaching in the
near future. With robust, precise, and safe AFF control systems, fuel economy ex-
14
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center Photo Colection
http:/www.dfrc.nasa.govgalley/photO/lndex.hl
NASA Photo: ECO1-0328-3 Date: November 9, 2001 Photo by: Carla Thomas
Smoke generators show the twistng paths of wingtip vortices behind two NASA Dryden F/A-18 Jets used in the
Autonomous Formation Fight (AFF) program
Figure 1-2: Autonomous Formation Flight of Two F/A-18 Aircraft
tends to the domains of the cargo and passenger aircraft. In other future applications,
such as aerial refueling, aircraft logistics, UAV swarming, and air traffic control, sig-
nificant progress will be made with AFF technology.
1.1.2 Human Supervisory Issues in AFF
Machines are now carrying out many functions that have been performed only by
humans: sensing variables, interpreting data, making decisions, and generating dis-
plays. Accordingly, the human is not directly in the control loop, but just supervises
15
whether or not the automation works as intended, which is known as human super-
visory control. Human supervisory control (HSC) means that one or more human
operators are intermittently programming and receiving information from a com-
puter that interconnects through sensors and actuators to the controlled process or
task environment [24]. The five roles for the supervisor are carried out during hu-
man supervisory control are illustrated in Figure 1-3. The supervisor begins with
planning a task, and teaches the computer the planned task secondly. The third role
is to activate and monitor the automation, and the fourth role is to intervene into
the automation when required. Finally, the human learns from the experience and
evaluates the performance. Figure 1-3 shows that the inner loop is activated when
the supervisor intervenes in the automation, and the outer loop is activated when the
supervisor learns from the experience and projects the learning to planning the next
task [23].
Figure 1-3: Five Roles of the Human Supervisor [24]
An automated system is thought to perform functions that have been performed
16
by humans more efficiently, reliably and accurately than a human operator. There is
also the expectation that the automated machine can perform these functions at a
lower cost than the human operator. Therefore, automated technology has advanced
and become more prevalent, being applied at a rapid rate [17]. Failures and upsets of
an automatic system, however, often lead to the catastrophic damage. Intervention by
human operators occurs when failures or abnormalities occur in the automatic system,
and the supervisor must interrupt the automation and manually take control. The
question arises as to how and when the decision to intervene should be made by the
human operator.
One of the technical challenges in keeping minimum drag formations is that the
trailing aircraft cannot stay in a precise position. Since it is not possible for a pilot to
fly manually in formation for long periods, it is generally accepted that the aircraft
will require an AFF system to maximize the fuel savings and to fly safely. One crucial
question in AFF research is to understand how a pilot functions as a human supervisor
of the AFF control system. Employment of an automatic system deprives a human
of control authority. However, a human is still responsible for monitoring the status
of the automation even though the automatic system is in charge of station-keeping.
The human supervisor generally intervenes when the computer does not carry out
the designated goals, or when the state of the automation is abnormal [23].
Many researchers have attempted to design and develop AFF control algorithms
and to implement AFF systems [15]. One challenge is how station-keeping displays
should be designed to support pilot's monitoring of the AFF system. The AFF
station-keeping display should provide the pilot with enough information to be aware
of both current and future states of the system such that the pilot can judge if the
automation is performing correctly. Without timely understanding of the current
states, the pilot who is not actually flying the aircraft may not intervene with the
AFF system correctly. As aircraft flying in formation is a high-risk environment,
misunderstanding and extended time even for correct interventions could result in a
catastrophe. However, AFF station-keeping may be less than fully perfect and re-
liable. The automatic system may not always operate in the intended way, so the
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pilot might need to intervene. Thus, the key role of the station-keeping display is
to send the pilot information concerning when the aircraft is in a dangerous position
that requires intervention. Because the fundamental goal of AFF is to reduce energy
expenditure, the station-keeping display should also minimize erroneous pilot inter-
ventions, which negates the benefit of the fuel savings. In addition to cost issues,
once the pilot decides to intervene with the AFF system, the mental and physical
workload highly increases as opposed to monitoring the display. The human does not
rely on the automated system and the control authority shifts from the AFF system
to the human pilot. The human pilot may control the formation flight temporarily
before the AFF system corrects back to function normally or take control over the
formation flight to the end of the given mission due to the irreversible failure of the
AFF system.
One issue in monitoring AFF station-keeping is pilot's trust in the automation.
Trust level of the human operator in the automation is a critical component of any
HSC system with uncertainty, so understanding how the pilot's trust level is influ-
enced in dynamic environments is considerably important [13]. Trust is considered a
substantial factor in maximizing benefits obtained from the human-automation sys-
tem. Previous studies revealed that the decision to perform the task manually or
automatically depends upon the trust the human operators invest in the automation
[12]. With low trust level in the automated system, the human operator is reluctant
to use the automation and prevents the benefits from the automation. Excessive
trust in the automated system causes the human operator complacent and to fail to
intervene in the face of extreme situations.
There are a number of operational parameters that can affect the pilot's inter-
vention performance such as a dynamic level of maneuverability and tight-tracking
performance of the AFF controller. Trailing aircraft pilots develop a decision criterion
for intervention depending on the relative position of the wing tip to the vortex area
generated by the leading aircraft. For example, suppose that the leading aircraft in
AFF entered a sharp turn. Then the vortices are created along the flight path of the
leading aircraft, which influences the decision criteria to intervene because the vortex
18
area moves quickly following the motion of the leading aircraft.
1.2 Research Objectives
The research objective of this thesis in the context of human supervisory control is to
investigate trust levels and performance of the human supervisor in the monitoring
of AFF station-keeping. The first hypothesis in this research is that operational con-
ditions have a significant effect on the intervening performance by human supervisor.
The second hypothesis is that trust will be affected by operational conditions. In or-
der to achieve these research goals, the display for station-keeping was designed based
on dynamic simulation of the two-ship formation flight. This display was utilized for
human experiments and data collected from the experiments were statistically ana-
lyzed.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The chapter contents are summarized as
follows:
" Chapter 1, Introduction, introduced research objectives and goals, and motivates
the research effort.
" Chapter 2, Background, discusses previous works dealing with human interac-
tion with automation and trust levels in the automation. It also describes the
basic theory of formation flight and AFF control algorithms.
" Chapter 3, Simulation and Display Design, is devoted to the development of a
simulation of formation flight and display design. Aerodynamic models, con-
troller design, and formation system description are addressed.
" Chapter 4, Experiments, discusses experimental designs and tasks of the human
subjects.
19
" Chapter 5, Results, presents the statistical analysis of data from the experiment
described in the previous chapter.
* Chapter 6, Discussion, combines the results with the primary hypotheses and
discusses the statistical analysis.
" Chapter 7, Conclusion, discusses the results and summarizes the thesis work.
Based on these conclusions, the possible topic for future works are proposed.
20
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the theoretical background on formation flight and explains
the principle of the drag reduction. It then reviews the related works of AFF control
systems and compares the different types of controllers that are used in formation
flight. Finally, it provides the detailed discussion on trust in relation to automation
and signal detection theory.
2.1 Basic Theory on Formation Flight
Wing-tip vortices form due to the difference in pressure between the upper and lower
surfaces of a wing. The physical mechanism for generating lift on the wing is the
combination of a high pressure on the bottom surface and a low pressure on the
top surface. The net imbalance of pressure distribution generates the lift at a wing.
However, as a byproduct of this pressure imbalance, the flow near the wing tips
tends to roll up around the wing tips. These wing-tip vortices are counter-rotating
and are essentially horizontal tornadoes that trail downstream of the finite wing.
Eventually the tip vortices dissipate, their energy transformed by viscosity. The tip
vortices produce additional downwash behind the wing within the wingspan. All the
air within the wingspan has a tendency to move downward whereas all the air outside
of the wingspan moves upward. Figure 2-1 illustrates the vortex flow produced by a
jet airplane.
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Rear view
Upwash Upwas
DownwashUpa
Figure 2-1: Wing tip vortex generated by a jet aircraft [22]
Drag reduction is obtained when the trailing aircraft is positioned in the upwash
field generated by the leading aircraft [10]. Figure 2-2, adapted from Ray et al. [20],
shows the rotation of the the lift (L) and drag (D) by the change in angle of attack
(Aa), which is due to the upwash (W) generated by the vortex. L' and D' represent
the rotation of the original lift and drag. Two primary assumptions in this theory are
that lift is greater than drag by an order of magnitude (L > D), and that the Aa
value is small enough that sin(Aa) can be approximated by Aa with high accuracy.
AD
4 ntation
L' L Olsc 01W
:.\P~fwdodpwmi
korce: L + D2
*AL
D
V
Figure 2-2: Rotation of resultant aerodynamic force caused by upwash [20]
This theory points out the magnitude of the resultant force (v/L 2 + D 2) is constant
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because the upwash just changes the direction of the force:
L2+ D2 = V/L'2 + D'2 (2.1)
The term AD represents the drag change due to the rotation of the original lift
force from L to L'. The total drag during formation flight, DF, is represented as
follows:
DF= D'cos(Aa) - AD (2.2)
where
AD = sin(Aa)L (2.3)
Similarly, the term delta L represents the lift change due to the rotation of the
drag force from D to D'. The total lift during formation flight, LF, is represented as
follows:
LF= L'cos(Aa) + AL (2.4)
where
AL = sin(Aa)D (2.5)
Because lift is assumed to be an order of magnitude greater than drag (L > D),
drag change becomes significantly greater than lift change:
sin(Aa)L > sin(Aa)D (2.6)
AD > AL (2.7)
Thus, considerable drag reduction can be attained by a small change in angle of
attack, while lift is not significantly influenced. Reduced drag can yield lower fuel
consumption since drag is proportionally related to fuel consumption. In reality, the
upwash field outside of the wingspan does not simply rotate the aerodynamic forces
of the trailing wing. However, the other effects of upwash are not considered because
the rotation is the dominant effect [20].
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2.2 AFF Control Algorithms
It is known that the trailing aircraft can benefit from drag reduction only when it is
placed in a limited area of the vortex generated by its leading aircraft [2]. This area
is called the sweet spot. However, it is also well known that efficient and collision-
free formation flight requires highly accurate sensors, coordination protocols [6], and
precise control systems. One of the main prerequisites for effective and safe missions
is tight guidance and precise control of individual aircraft. This guidance and con-
trol algorithm should support a number of different tasks: formation initialization,
formation contraction and expansion, coordinated turns, and pilot intervention.
Various automatic control algorithms have been developed to implement tight-
tracking for drag reduction. The automatic control of the two-ship formation flight
was considered [14], and this research resulted in the efficient design of proportional
and integral (PI) controller that holds the lateral and longitudinal separation between
the aircraft. In another study, close formation control where the lateral separation is
less than wingspan was introduced with additional attention to the optimal formation-
geometry for drag reduction [16]. A linear PI control law was employed and enabled
the aircraft to take advantage of the reduction in the induced drag. In [14] and [16],
the formation dynamics were confined to the horizontal plane and the aircraft were
commanded to change the heading angle with a simple step function.
Other AFF control systems were further developed including full three-dimensional
formation dynamics. A proportional, integral and derivative (PID) controller for the
trailing aircraft was designed to maintain the specified formation despite the ma-
neuver of the leading aircraft. Two candidate PID controllers were discussed and
their performances were compared in three dimensions[7]. In [25], the author used
the model of the relative distances dynamics to design a feedback-linearizing control
system, but the model contains singular points. Recently, adaptive formation control
algorithms were developed based on the body frames of the leading and trailing air-
craft in the two-dimensional plane [3]. Nonlinear guidance algorithms also have been
developed for tight tracking of curved paths and implemented with two UAVs [18].
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If the desired trajectory is close to a straight line or a gentle curve then a simple
control algorithms such as linear feedback controllers can provide acceptable perfor-
mance [18]. The most common methodology in the linear feedback control is the PID
controller. The PID controller receives signals from sensors and computes corrective
action to the actuators from a computation based on the error (proportional), the
sum of all previous errors (integral) and the rate of change of the error (derivative).
A proportional controller is typically the main drive in a control loop and reduces
a large part of the overall error. An integral controller reduces the final error in a
system. Summing even a small error produces a drive signal large enough to move
the system toward a smaller error. A derivative error helps reduce overshoot and
damping. It has no effect on final error.
2.3 Signal Detection Theory
While the automated station-keeping will be expected to be reliable, it could fail
or its function degraded, which leads to an extreme situation. Intervention into
the AFF system by the human operator is required especially when the automated
systems malfunction or their functions degrade. In addition to potential mechanical
malfunctions, external environmental conditions, such as weather and any deviation
from flight routines, also require quick human response. In this context, intervention
is the last step taken by the human operator when the AFF system works improperly.
Failure to understand those extreme situations and to interrupt the AFF system can
result in disastrous consequences. When an extreme situation exists, the pilot can
decide that the extreme situation is present or absent. These decisions are otherwise
known as hits and misses respectively. Even if there is no extreme situation, the pilot
can still decide that that the extreme situation is present or absent. These decisions
are otherwise known as false alarms and correct rejections.
In the AFF system, intervention by the pilot has a disadvantage: the increase of
the operating cost. The ultimate goal of the AFF is to reduce the operation cost by de-
creasing the fuel expenditure. The pilot cannot keep maximum drag formation flight
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with manual control as precisely as the AFF system does. Manual formation flight
diminishes the aerodynamic benefits attained by the AFF formation flight. There-
fore, avoiding unnecessary interventions, which are defined by false alarms in this
research, plays a vital role to decrease the overall cost of the AFF and becomes one of
the reasonable measurements of the pilots intervention performance while monitoring
the station-keeping display.
The terminology of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections falls within
the domain of signal detection theory (SDT). The basic assumption for SDT is that
most decisions are made in the presence of some uncertainty. SDT provides a precise
notation for analyzing decision making in the presence of uncertainty. SDT evolved
from the development of communications and radar equipment during World War II.
Then it moved to psychology in an attempt to understand some of the features of
human behavior when humans make a decision, facing confusing stimuli. A classic
radar is a typical example for SDT. When the radar detects an object, a radar operator
makes a decision whether or not it is a signal of the enemy. However, other objects
also cause similar signals, which makes the situation difficult. When the signal comes
from the enemy, the radar operator can decide that it is either from the enemy or
other objects. These outcomes are called hits and misses. If the signal comes from
other objects, the operator can still decide that the signal is either from the enemy or
other objects. These are called false alarms or correct rejections respectively. These
outcomes are displayed in Figure 2-3.
Signal
Present Absent
Present Hit
Decision Correct
Rejection
Figure 2-3: Signal Detection Theory
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Figure 2-4 shows a graph of two hypothetical response curves. The left curve is the
noise-alone probability density function, and the right curve is the signal-plus-noise
distribution probability density function. It is assumed that the noise is normally
distributed around the signal. The response for the signal-plus-noise is generally
greater but the curves overlap, which means the response for a noise-alone trial may
exceed the response for a signal-plus-noise trial.
Distribution of responses Distribution of reponses
when signal is absent. when signal is present
.0
response
Figure 2-4: Probability density function for noise-alone and signal-plus-noise trials
[9]
One of the main components to the decision-making process is a criterion. The
simplest strategy that a human uses is to pick a criterion along the response axis.
The vertical line in Figure 2-5 indicates a criterion. The criterion line divides the
graph into four sections: hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections.
Thus, the human cannot always make correct decisions by manipulating the de-
cision criterion. Suppose that humans choose a low criterion, so they very frequently
respond at a slight signal that the signal is present. Then they will not miss the signal
and they will have a high hit rate. However, responding at a slight signal will signif-
icantly increase the number of false alarms. If the subjects choose a high criterion,
then they are unlikely to respond the signal is present even when the signal is real.
They will not make false alarms, but they will also miss many real signals.
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criterion response
B miss hit
0I-
response
correct reject
false alarmn
0
-o
response
Figure 2-5: Criterion and outcomes: hits, misses, false alarm, and correct rejections
[9]
2.4 Trust in Automation
Humans' trust in the automated system may influence the utilization of the automated
system over manual control. The human operator who does not trust in an automated
system may reject the use of the automation, no matter how intelligent it may be. If
the human operators are forced to use the automation that they do not trust, it may
be demanding and time consuming, and leads to degraded human performance. On
the other hand, a human may trust the automation more than they should, allowing
it to perform functions which can be performed better by a human or which may
cause a system failure. Experiments conducted by Muir showed that decreases in
trust corresponded to decreases in the use of the automated system [12]. However,
Lee and Moray suggested that trust alone does not guide the percentage of time spent
using the automatic control system [11]. Experiments conducted by Lee and Moray
showed the operators' confidence in their manual control skills has a large influence
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on choosing the manual control over the automatic controller.
Zuboff investigated the importance of trust in the relationship between operators
and the systems with which they interact [291. She documented operators' trust in the
use of automation and her studies revealed two interesting phenomena. First, when
the operators lack trust in a new technology, they often form a barrier, preventing the
potential benefits that the new technology offered. Second, operators sometimes put
excessive trust in the new technology, becoming complacent and failing to intervene
when the technology failed.
In the human-machine systems, various machines have unequal predictability and
reliability, and different functions of even a single machine do not necessarily have
equal predictability and reliability. Therefore, it is infeasible for the human operator
to trust or distrust them all equally. The human operator needs to adjust trust in
machines, that is, to set trust to a level corresponding to trustworthiness of a machine
or a function. Even though different machines show similar predictability, trust in
machines will depend on the operator's mental models. Mental models are humans'
views of a system that are formulated through interactions with the system. These
models provide predictive and explanatory ability to understand both the system and
interactions with the system [5].
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Chapter 3
Simulation and Display Design
This chapter provides the details of a two-ship autonomous formation flight simula-
tion and the design of the station-keeping monitoring display developed to study the
effects of the operational conditions on human performance and trust in the automatic
system.
3.1 Simulation
A two-ship formation flight was simulated on the basis of general aircraft dynamics,
aerodynamics and automatic control. The basic model of the formation flight in
this work is based on a Boeing 747 cargo airplane, which will be the most likely
application of AFF in the commercial sector. The speed and altitude of both airplanes
are assumed to be constant in order to simulate en-route conditions.
3.1.1 AFF Characteristics
Table 3.1 shows the formation flight characteristics in this work. Boeing 747 airplanes
are flying in formation, where the trailing aircraft is behind the leading aircraft. They
are keeping 500-meter downstream separation and flying at the altitude of 30,000 feet
with the cruise speed 0.85 Mach (Figure 3-1). According to [2], the downstream
separation should be between three and ten times of the wing span.
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Basic Model Two Boeing 747s
Cruise Speed 0.855 Mach
Altitude (h) 30,000 feet
Wingspan (b) 211 feet (64 meters)
Downstream Separation (d) 0.27 nautical mile (500 meters)
15* (Passenger)MAX. Angle of bank (AOB) 5(argo)
I 25 (Cargo)
Table 3.1: Formation Flight Characteristics
Behind the leading aircraft, two vortex legs are shed and parallels by (7r/4)b
after the vortex is fully developed [26]. The automatic controller mounted on the
trailing aircraft keeps the formation, maximizing drag reduction, by positioning the
trailing aircraft safely in vortex. Seven wingspans are selected in this simulation. In
the previous research of the fighter aircraft AFF, two F/A-18s were longitudinally
separated by three wingspans [8], but due to the low maneuverability, a large aircraft
requires more spacing to guarantee against a nose-to-tail crash.
3.1.2 Wing Tip Vortex and Drag Reduction
Aerodynamic drag is influenced by many factors such as wing shapes, size, and flow
conditions. In the three-dimensional wing, there is an additional component of drag,
called induced drag. This type of drag is created by the wing tip vortex and is a
dominant drag component in high-lift wing such as Boeing 747. The ultimate goal of
AFF is to reduce the induced drag of the trailing aircraft by properly positioning the
trailing aircraft in the vortex, which results in the fuel savings. Total induced drag
of a formation of two identical aircraft can be written as [19]:
CDi - CL,12  CL,2 2 CL,1CL,2U1 (3.1)
* xAR + AR wAR
The first two terms, which are fixed values, in Equation 3.1 represent the induced
drag of leading and trailing aircraft respectively. These values depend on the aspect
ratio and lift coefficient. The third term represents the mutual induced drag, which
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Cross Track Error (Ye )
Figure 3-1: Formation Geometry
is given by coefficient of mutual induced drag, a1. A variety of aerodynamic methods
can be used to compute the induced drag, and the horseshoe vortex model gives the
term a1 as [19]:
1 (4 + 2( 2 (n2 + (7r/4)2) + (772 - (r/4)32)2U1 = 2 (3.2)
72 ((2 + q2)2
Spacing variables in Equation 3.2 are shown in Figure 3-2. Variables are non-
dimensionalized by the wingspan. Equation 3.2 is graphically shown in the contour
map in Figure 3-3. Positive values of a1 indicates the increase of the total induced drag
and negative values of oi indicates the decrease of the total induced drag. Figure 3-3
indicates that the maximum drag reduction is achieved when the wings are overlapped
by 22% of the wingspan and two aircraft are co-planar. The area of maximum drag
reduction area is very small, with a radius smaller than a tenth of a wingspan.
Drag reduction can be substantially attained when the wing tip of the trailing
aircraft stays inside the contour where 01 is less than or equal to -0.12 [2]. Drag
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(b)
Leading Aircraft (1)
Figure 3-2: Formation Flight Geometry
increases or decreases slightly outside of this contour.
22% Wing overlap
0.5
0
-0.5
0 0.5 1 1.5
Lateral Spacing Between Wing Centerlines, q
2
Figure 3-3: Variation of Mutual Induced Drag with Aircraft Position [2]
3.1.3 AFF Controller Design
The automatic controller is attached to the simulated trailing aircraft for station-
keeping mission. The controller operates to keep the trailing aircraft inside the vortex
area to reduce drag and to fly safely. The desired path for the wing tip of the trailing
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aircraft is the right vortex leg (Figure 3-1) where drag reduction is maximized. The
distance between the reference line, the right vortex leg, and the wing tip of the
trailing aircraft is defined as cross track error or lateral error. This simulation starts
with straight ffight of a formation of two Boeing 747s, having no cross track error.
When the two aircraft in formation turn without breaking the formation, the leading
aircraft changes the heading angle. Then the automatic controller gives the command
to the trailing aircraft to remove the nonzero cross track error. Lateral acceleration
caused by angle of bank is used to correct the wing tip position back to the reference
position. The basic dynamic model can be approximated to a double integrator
because the position error is controlled by the acceleration. Figure 3-4 shows the rear
view of the trailing aircraft and the vortex generated by the leading aircraft. The
elliptic in Figure 3-4 represents the vortex area created by the leading Boeing 747
where o, in Equation 3.1 is less than or equal to -0.12. The cross represents the wing
tip position of the trailing aircraft. The dot is the vortex leg in Figure 3-2 where
the induced drag is minimized. The major axis of the vortex area is estimated to
35.8m and the vortex leg from the right wing is shifted to the left from the center. In
order for the wing tip to stay inside this area, the maximum overshoot to the left side
should be less 10.6m, which is estimated by multiplying the lateral spacing in Figure
3-3 with the wing span of the Boeing 747.
L 
cos#
10.6 m Lsin#0 4
Yref V*e
35.8 m
Figure 3-4: Vortex Area and Trailing Aircraft (Rear View)
As shown in Figure 3-4, the vertical component of the lift is identical to the weight
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of the aircraft because it is assumed to be altitude-hold. The weight is assumed to
be constant because the experiment (to be discussed in Chapter 4) only lasts for 20
minutes.
Lcos# = W = mg (3.3)
Lift becomes as:
L = mg (3.4)
cos #
Lateral acceleration becomes by the Newton's Second Law as:
L sinq# mg sinq #
aLateral = L x = gtan# (3.5)
m cos#5 m
The simple derivation of the lateral acceleration indicates the relation to the bank
angle in Equation 3.5. To stabilize the formation flight system, a PID controller was
implemented for the lateral channel as seen in Equation 3.6. kd, kp, and ki represent
the derivative, proportional, and integral controller gains respectively.
aLateral (kd~e + kpye + ki j y. dx) (3.6)
In order to detect the lateral error (ye), a discrete step approach was taken. In the
simulation of the AFF system, the time increment (At) was set to 100 milliseconds.
Figure 3-5 shows the evolution of the detection logic in one time increment. In this
diagram, reference points at each discrete time are marked by crosses on the reference
line, which the wing tip of the trailing aircraft needs to track. At a certain instant of
t,,, the first step was to find the first and second close reference points to the wing tip
across the n reference points. Distances from the wing tip of the trailing aircraft to
n reference points were measured and a bubble sort algorithm was used to find these
two reference points. The first and second close reference points in this diagram were
at tk and tk+1-
Then two vectors, which are t and R., were defined from these two reference
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tit
t-1
tk+1
kDt
tj~ Ye
k-14
Figure 3-5: Discrete Representation: One Time Step
points and the position of the wing tip as seen in Figure 3-5. The magnitude of ye
became
IYel = t. Ijsin3 (3.7)
where
2
sin#= 1- D" " (3.8)
The sign of ye was negative when the wing tip of the trailing aircraft is to the left of
the reference line. Finally, the lateral error was detected approximately as
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ye = Sgn((Dt. x Rt) -k) yel
2
-. D -. R.
= Sgn((D, x Rt.) - ) 1R  - " _"
where k is a unit vector of the z-direction in Figure 3-2.
In a coordinated level turn, the heading angle (V) is simply decided by the speed
(V) and the angle of bank (#). This relation became
(3.9)
The mechanism of the guidance logic in this simulation is shown in Figure 3-6 with
the discrete representation of Equation 3.9. According to the discrete time approach,
the trailing aircraft translates by AS and rotates by Ap at each time step.
Refirence Lines
ve(tie }
Ve(t
ti+
TI
Figure 3-6: Discrete Representation of Trailing Aircraft Guidance Logic: One Time
Step
The reference line is to the left of the wing tip of the trailing aircraft and the lateral
error is a negative value. Therefore, at the next time step, the heading direction
rotated counter-clockwise due to the lateral acceleration. The whole closed loop AFF
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/* gtan 0(t) dt = V(t)
system in this simulation is the combination of the lateral error detection, the PID
controller and the guidance logic, and the block diagram is shown in Figure 3-7.
PID Controllers
Figure 3-7: Block Digram of Dynamic Systems in the AFF
This closed loop includes the nonlinear element: a sine function. However, the
perturbation of the heading angle (Wp) at one time step is assumed to be small so that
sin tp can be approximated to so. Then the open loop transfer function of the AFF
system became the double integrator (Figure 3-8).
PID Controllen
~ ~ ~ d i s tu r b a w e
kS
+ +
noise
Figure 3-8: Simplified Block Diagram
In real formation flight, sensors, filters, and communication devices are included
in the control loop to detect the relative positions of the aircraft without noise signals,
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but this simulation is carried out computationally so it is assumed that two aircraft
are able to detect the relative position and to estimate the vortex position to a great
extent. The closed loop transfer function was derived from the above block diagram.
kds 2 + ks + k(
GCL(s) = ~ ks+~~ 2 (3.10)GCL(sa + kas2 + kps + k
3.2 Design of Station-keeping Display
Based on the AFF simulation, a station-keeping display was designed. C++ was used
as the programming language. Open graphic library (OpenGL) and Microsoft foun-
dation class (MFC) library were incorporated to support the graphical presentation
of the simulation result. For a real-time simulation, a window timer was employed
to set a time increment in the simulation as 100 milliseconds. This display would be
mounted on the trailing aircraft and monitored by the pilot in the trailing aircraft.
The display consisted of five components: vortex area generated by the leading air-
craft, wing tip position of the trailing aircraft, warning signal, basic flight data, and
static formation diagram. Figure 3-9 shows the AFF station-keeping display.
Fig ure 3-9: AW arn ing S ig nal
3D Vortex
Tunnel
Generated by
Leader
Formation Type
- White: Loader
- Green: Trailer
- Vortex Tunnel |Wing Tip
IPosition
Figure 3-9: AFF Station-keeping Display
The vortex area is depicted as a three-dimensional tunnel in the display. The outer
40
most circle represents the area where the o, is equal to -0.12 and drag is substantially
reduced. The vortex tunnel moves following the flight motion of the leading aircraft.
To design a three-dimensional display, a variety of effects are employed. Colors in
the display were coded as an RGB image, which combines red, green, and blue color
components for each individual pixel. In an RGB image of double type, the color
values of red, blue, and green range from 0.0 to 1.0, 0.0 being the darkest and 1.0
being the brightest. Among the series of vortex circles, every fifth circle has a different
color from the other four circles. The RGB array for every five circle was (1.0, 1.0,
0.0), while the other four circles had a RGB image of (1.0, 0.85, 0.0). As the aircraft fly
forward, a series of vortex circles approaches toward the human operator. Differently
colored circles generate the three-dimensional flow effect of the vortex tunnel. A
perspective representation was supported by the color gradation.
Figure 3-10: Warning Signal Activation
The background is black because cargo airplanes usually fly at night, which rep-
resents instrument meteorological conditions. Conventional displays used at night
require dark backgrounds to promote night vision. The white cross represents the
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wing tip of the trailing aircraft, whose motion is controlled by the automatic system.
In order to simulate the motions of the aircraft, a random function is added in the
motion of the white cross that moves the cross slightly. Basic flight data are provided
in the display: cruise speed, distance between the leading and trailing aircraft, angle
of bank, and heading angle. When the white cross goes outside of the 80% of the
vortex area, the warning signal above the vortex area is activated visually, chang-
ing from a brown "WARNING OFF" to a red "WARNING ON." Figure 3-10 shows
the warning activation in the display. The warning signal was provided to notify
the human operator that the wing tip approaches to the vortex boundary. However,
warning activation does not necessarily mean the cross will go out and thus the wing
tip of the trailing aircraft is no longer properly placed in the vortex. The goal of
the warning system is to inform the human operator that the wing tip is close to the
borderline of the vortex area. A static formation flight overview is displayed at the
bottom left, which is the illustration of top view of formation flight.
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Chapter 4
Experiments
The first part of this chapter presents the experimental procedures. The last part of
this chapter provides the experimental design and participants.
4.1 Experimental Procedures
The subjects were instructed to monitor the station-keeping display as a trailing
aircraft pilot in the AFF task. The trailing aircraft pilot is flying in a Boeing 747
cargo airplane at night time following the leading aircraft. The trailing aircraft pilot
receives information of the vortex area and the wing tip's position only through the
visual display. Each subject was given a practice scenario. Through the practice
scenario, subjects recognized that a lateral error occured during the level turns and
the AFF controller commanded corrective actions to the trailing aircraft.
The primary task was to make a decision to intervene with the AFF system in
case of extreme situations. The ultimate goal of AFF is to guarantee safety and
to maximize the fuel saving so the pilot should minimize the poor performance, as
defined by false alarms and misses.
During test sessions, the leading aircraft deviated from the straight path to turn to
the specified heading angle and the white cross, the wing tip of the trailing aircraft,
sometimes approached to the borderline of the vortex area. During the transient
response time, the corrective action by the PID controller, which included oscillation
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and overshoot of the wing tip, caused the cross to be close to the boundary of the
vortex area. The visual warning was then activated as mentioned in Chapter 3. The
subjects were required to decide whether or not to interrupt the AFF system and take
control. However, the warning activation did not necessarily mean the cross would go
out. When the subjects decided to interrupt the AFF system, they pushed the space
bar on the keyboard. Then the display stopped and the screen shot of the display was
captured and saved. This screen shot informed relative position of the wing tip to
the vortex area at the human's intervention. To continue the experiment, the subject
pushed the shift key.
A secondary task was given to the subjects, which was observing the distance
between the leading and trailing aircraft, because in the cockpit during an actual
AFF mission, the pilot's attention cannot be entirely allocated to the AFF display.
In order for the subject not to fixate on the cross position, the subject was asked to
record on a sheet of paper when the nose-to-tail distance was less than 0.26 nautical
miles.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 Independent Variables
Based on the AFF station-keeping display designed in Chapter 3, experiments on
human subjects were designed and conducted. Two independent variables were used
in this research: damping ratio of the AFF controller and limit of the bank angle
command to leading aircraft. A human operator monitors whether or not the AFF
system is working properly. Through the display, a human makes a decision to in-
tervene the AFF system by watching the motions of vortex and wing tip position.
When the cross, representing the wing tip of the trailing aircraft, fails to stay inside
the vortex area, the pilot should interrupt the AFF system and take control over the
aircraft. The pilot judges to intervene the AFF system from two sources - the motion
of the vortex and the motion of the cross.
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The vortex motion at level flight is primarily affected by the angle of bank because
the vortex trails the wing tip of the leading aircraft. When the leading aircraft turns
and heads toward a specified direction, the speed (V) and the angle of bank (#)
decide the heading angle (o) in a coordinated turn (Equation 3.9). In contrast, the
motion of the wing tip is affected by the controller of the AFF system. The AFF
controller commands the trailing aircraft to keep the wing tip inside the vortex area by
removing the cross track error. With a low damping ratio, the wing tip corrects back
to the reference position with high oscillation. On the contrary, when the damping
ratio is high, the wing tip moves smoothly without the oscillation. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that two factors, the angle of bank and the damping ratio of the AFF
controller, have a significant effect on human's intervention with the automation while
monitoring the display.
In this study, both factors were designed to have two factor levels. When the
leading aircraft entered level turning motions, two angles of bank, 150 and 250, were
commanded to the leading aircraft. These values were selected because typically, the
bank angle should be less than 150 in passenger aircraft and 250 in cargo aircraft.
The lateral error of the wing tip position was corrected by the AFF controller
with two different damping ratios, 0.1 and 0.7. From a controller-designing point of
view, 0.7 is considered as a reasonable damping ratio [4]. The motion of the wing tip
was oscillatory for a low damping ratio while for a high damping ratio, the motion
showed no oscillation but became smooth. In the PID controller, a high derivative
controller gain was required for 0.7 damping ratio. 0.1 damping ratio was selected
for low damping because 0.1 damping ratio represents oscillation that can be visibly
detected. The PID controller whose damping ratio was 0.1 should have relatively a
high gain for an integral controller. When the trailing aircraft tracked the leading
aircraft with 0.1 damping ratio, a pilot could observe oscillatory movement of the
wing tip.
The two levels of damping ratio and two levels of angle of bank lead to 2 x 2 factor-
level combinations. Two factors are fully crossed, i.e. all combinations of the levels
of two factors are included in the study. Table 4.1 shows four factor levels. One
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experimental scenario is designed for each factor level.
Damping ratio
0.1 0.7
15 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Angle of Bank
(deg) 25 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Table 4.1: Factor Combination
The controller gains are calculated to meet the given damping ratio and the over-
shoot condition. Based on the wingspan of the Boeing 747 (64 meters), the overshoot
of the wing tip from the desired path should be less than 10.6 meters in the context
of drag reduction. PID controller gains are figured out by trial and error such that
the wing tip stays marginally inside the vortex area at level turns unless turns have
failure mode. Table 4.2 shows all PID controller gains, kp, ki and kd.
kd kp kz
Scenario 1 2.861 1.296 2.338
Scenario 2 4.462 2.428 0.657
Scenario 3 3.107 1.992 3.856
Scenario 4 4.900 4.005 1.620
Table 4.2: PID Controller Gains
When the controller has low damping ratio (Scenario 1 and 3), the integral con-
troller gain is relatively high in comparison with the proportional and derivative
controller gains. On the contrary, the derivative controller gain is dominant with
high damping ratio (Scenario 2 and 4).
As seen in Equation 3.10, the closed-loop transfer function had a third-order
characteristic equation, which has one pole on the real axis and two complex conjugate
poles as shown in Figure 4-1. The response of the AFF system is governed by two
complex poles because the response by the real pole converges to the reference quickly.
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Figure 4-1: Location of Ploes (Left: Scenario 1 & 3, Right: Scenario 2 & 4)
The damping ratio (C) approximately becomes:
( = sin6 (4.1)
where 0 is the deviation angle of the complex pole from the imaginary axis.
4.2.2 Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables were measured in this experiment: the intervention accu-
racy of the human operator, and the position and the velocity of the wing tip at the
moment of intervention. While monitoring the station-keeping display, the pilot could
make four types of decision based on the signal detection theory discussed in Chapter
2: hit, false alarm, miss and correct rejection. Among four decisions, misses and
false alarms are grouped into the incorrect decision category. By analyzing the total
number of incorrect decisions, misses and false alarms, the human's performance was
measured. Secondly, the position and the velocity of the wing tip at the intervention
were selected as dependent variables because investigation of these two variables will
provide the human's decision criterion to intervene the AFF system.
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4.2.3 Design of Experimental Scenarios
Each test scenario consists of eight level turns and six minutes are required to com-
plete each scenario. Between turns, straight flight is inserted and the duration of
straight flight is selected randomly between 17 and 23 seconds. The leading aircraft
is commanded to fly to a specified heading angle in each scenario. When the angle of
bank is limited to 15* (scenario 1 and 2), the heading angle is commanded to change
300, 600 and 900 at each turn. On the contrary, when the leading aircraft banks up
to 250 (scenario 3 and 4), the aircraft can change the heading angle by 600, 1200 and
1800 at each turn.
Turn Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
1 30R1-E 60R 180L
2 90R
3 90L 60L 180L 60R
4 60R 30L - 120L
5 30R 30R 60R
6 90R 90L 120L 180R
7 60L 120R 60L
8 60R 60L 120L
Table 4.3: Turns in Scenarios and Failure Mode Turnings (Gray)
R and L in Table 4.3 represents right and left turns. In the experimental scenario
design, orders of both heading angle changes and turning directions are randomized
to prevent the ordering effect. Two out of eight turns have a failure mode. A failure
mode indicates a malfunction of the AFF system where the white cross, the wing tip
of the trailing aircraft, goes outside of the vortex area. Figure 4-2 shows the failure
of the AFF system.
When the AFF system fails to control the wing tip to stay in the vortex region,
the pilot has responsibility to intervene with the AFF system and takes control over
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Figure 4-2: Failure Mode
the entire system for safety. Turns that have a failure mode are randomly distributed
among eight turns in each scenario and are represented as the gray boxes in Table
4.3. To simulate failure of the AFF system, controller gains were dropped for specified
turnings such that natural frequency of the closed-loop poles decreased to 80% of the
original and had the same damping ratio.
From Equation 3.9, time required for the heading angle change is calculated with
the given cruise speed. Times required for 30*, 60* and 90* heading angle changes
in scenario 1 and 2 are approximately equal to those for 600, 1200 and 1800 heading
angle changes in scenario 3 and 4 (Table 4.4).
Before these four scenarios, one practice scenario is provided for subjects to be
familiar with the display and the task. The practice scenario consists of 12 turns
that are combination of three turns from each scenario, and takes around 10 minutes.
Three failure modes are included in the practice scenario. Through this practice,
subjects are able to experience all scenarios.
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Bank Angle(deg) Time(sec) Heading Angle Change(deg)
8 30
Scenario 1 & 2 15 13 60
18 90
8.9 60
Scenario 3 & 4 25 14.5 120
20.2 180
Table 4.4: Time Required for Heading Angle Change
4.3 Participants
A total of 20 participants participated in this experiment, 15 men and 5 women. The
subject population consisted of undergraduates, graduates, and research scientists.
All personnel were affiliated with MIT. $10 an hour were paid to all participants.
The age of the subject population ranged from 21 to 31 with the average of 24.85
years.
50
Chapter 5
Results
This chapter provides the statistical results from the experiments described in Chapter
4. The first part of this chapter presents the human's intervention performance and
the last part describes the position and the velocity of the wing tip at the moment
of interventions. Intervention performance was evaluated by the counts of misses and
false alarms.
5.1 Intervention Performance
As described previously in Chapter 4, the human's decisions are categorized into four
decisions during the display-monitoring: hit, false alarm, miss and correct rejection.
Each experimental scenario had eight turns and two turns out of eight turns had a
failure mode. In the failure mode, the wing tip left the vortex area, which required
intervention. When the AFF system did not work properly, the pilot performed a
"hit" by interrupting the system correctly or a "miss" by failing to interrupt the
system during a failure mode. In contrast, if there was no extreme situation and the
pilot decided to interrupt the system, he/she performed a "false alarm", or if subjects
did not interrupt the system, they performed a "correct rejection." By measuring the
number of misses and false alarms, the performance of interventions can be analyzed.
Table 5.1 represents the sum across all 20 subjects for the four decisions in each
scenario.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Hit 26 33 25 26
Miss 14 7 15 14
False Alarm 19 25 32 29
Correct Rejection 101 95 88 91
Table 5.1: Intervention Performance Data
As described in the previous chapter, tests consisted of four scenarios. Two inde-
pendent variables, the angle of bank at turnings and the damping ratio of the AFF
controller, were introduced. Table 5.2 shows the four experimental scenarios.
Damping ratio
0.1 0.7
15 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Angle of Bank
(deg) 25 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Table 5.2: Factor Combination
5.1.1 Analysis of Missed Detections
The first performance metric examined was the number of misses for each AFF sce-
nario, and as discussed previously, there were four scenarios that occurred in the
random sequence. All the subjects were assigned to both the angle of bank and
damping ratio factors. Figure 5-1 shows the sum across all 20 subjects for misses in
each scenario.
Figure 5-1 demonstrates that the sum of misses performed by all subjects in
scenario 2 is remarkably smaller than that in the other scenarios. To analyze the
count of misses statistically, a Friedman test was used. The Friedman test is a non-
parametric test for analyzing randomized complete block designs. The Friedman
test specifics are included in Appendix A. The Friedman test showed that there is
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Figure 5-1: Sum of Misses
a significant difference between the factor levels (X2(3) = 9.111, p = 0.028). In
order to know where that difference lay, the significant difference of individual pairs
of scenarios was examined, which is known as post-hoc pairwise comparisons. The
Friedman pairwise test was used. The critical difference (D.it) value in this test is
given by the following formula when the significance level is 0.05 and 0.1, and the
test is one-tailed:
Det= 2.394 Nk(k + 1) (a = 0.05) (5.1)6
Det= 2.127 Nk(k + 1) (a = 0.1) (5.2)6
where N is the total number of subjects in the experiment and k is the number of
factor levels. If the observed difference between two rank totals is greater than the
critical difference, then it is significant. Table 5.3 provides the critical difference at
0.05 and 0.1 significance level and the observed differences.
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Critical Difference Observed Difference
a=0.05 a=O.1 1vs2 1vs3 2vs4 3vs4
19.55 17.35 14 2 14 2
Table 5.3: Friedman Multiple Pairwise Test in Misses
Even though the Friedman test showed the significant difference among the factor
levels, there was no pair with a significant difference at the same level (a = 0.05). This
fact indicates that the pairwise differences are not always necessary for the overall
difference. However, observed differences from two pairs, scenario 1 vs 2 and scenario
2 vs 4, were found to be the main source of the overall difference. Because interaction
between two independent variables was not considered in the analysis, two pairs,
scenario 2 vs 3 and scenario 1 vs 4, were not eligible for the pairwise comparison.
5.1.2 Analysis of False Alarm
In a similar manner, the number of false alarms in each scenario was examined. The
Friedman test revealed that there is a significant difference in the sum of false alarms
between the factor levels (X2 (3) = 8.718, p = 0.033). The sum of the false alarms for
each scenario was depicted in Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2 presents that subjects performed the most false alarms in scenario 3.
The difference between the scenarios was primarily due to the difference between
the scenario 1 and 3. Similarly, the Friedman pairwise test was used as a post-hoc
comparison test. The critical difference is identical to that in the analysis of misses.
Table 5.4 provides the critical difference and the observed differences. The observed
difference between scenario 1 and 3 is significant when a is 0.1.
Critical Difference Observed Difference
a=0.05 a=0.1 1vs2 1vs3 2vs4 3vs4
19.55 17.35 11.5 19 4 2.5
Table 5.4: Friedman Multiple Pairwise Test in False Alarms
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False Alarm
Figure 5-2:
------1
-
The reason we did not analyze hits and correct rejections is that the sum of hits
and misses is constant in each scenario as well as the sum of false alarms and correct
rejections.
5.1.3 Analysis of Poor Performance
Poor performance was previously defined as the incorrect decisions made by the hu-
man: misses and false alarms. It is critical to study the effect of the each factor on
the poor performance in order to understand the human's general performance under
the different operational conditions.
The poor performance measured in each scenario was calculated in Table 5.5
and graphically represented in Figure 5-3. According to the Friedman test, there
is a significant difference between rank totals of the scenarios (X2 (3) = 10.006, p =
0.019). It graphically appears that the angle of bank has strong effects on the poor
performance in the intervention with the AFF system because the number of poor
performances in scenario 3 and 4 was remarkably greater than that in scenario 1 and
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Scenario
1 2 3 4
Miss 14 7 15 14
False Alarm 19 25 32 29
Poor Performance 33 32 47 43
Table 5.5: Poor Performance
Misses & False Alarms
Scenario
Figure 5-3: Sum of Poor Performance
2. Similarly, the Friedman pairwise test was carried out to find out the
of the difference between rank totals of the scenarios (Table 5.6).
main sources
As shown in Table 5.6, the observed differences in rank totals from individual
pairs were small when the AFF was operated at 150 angle of bank. However, the
differences in rank totals increased as the angle of bank changed from 15* and 25*.
At sharp level turns generated by the high angle of bank, the human's performance
degraded and incorrect decisions increased. In addition to this result, the fewest poor
performances occurred when the smoothing controller was provided and the angle of
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Critical Difference Observed Difference
a=0.05 a=0.1 1vs2 1vs3 2vs4 3vs4
19.55 17.35 0 17.5 13.5 5
Table 5.6: Friedman Multiple Pairwise Test in Poor Performances
bank was limited to 150 at the level turn. On the contrary, the combination of the
oscillation controller and 25* angle of bank caused the greatest poor performances.
Both the graphical depiction and pairwise comparisons suggest that the angle
of bank influenced the overall poor performance so Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test was
used to examine that effect (Appendix A). This test demonstrated that there is a
significant difference in counts of poor performances between two bank angles (z=-
2.956, p=0.003). Figure 5-4 shows sum of the poor performances at each angle of
bank. As the angle of bank increases, both misses and false alarms increase.
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Figure 5-4: Poor Performances of each angle of bank
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5.2 Positions of the Wing Tip at Interventions
Because the previous analysis just considers the counts of incorrect performances,
the basic nature of human decision rules were not involved. In order to understand
what decision rules the human generated and how the human developed these rules,
the positions and velocities of the cross were investigated. Humans make decisions
through the display based on position and time derivatives of positions. Therefore,
to investigate the decision threshold at the moment of intervention, the positions of
the wing tips were analyzed first.
To quantify the positions of the wing tip at interventions, the radial distance of the
wing tip from the origin was measured from the screen shot of the display. The wing
tip and vortex area at the screen shot were mapped onto the non-dimensionalized
domain by the wing span. In Figure 5-5, the origin indicates where the maximum
drag reduction occured based on the horseshoe vortex model [19]. R2 is the distance
from the origin to the cross while R1 indicates the distance from the origin to the
vortex area boundary in the radial direction of the cross. The ratio of these two
radial distances, which is R2/R1 x 100%, was employed as a dependent variable in
this experiment. This dependent variable is illustrated in the Figure 5-5.
b 0.05 ....'. .. ---- -- - -... -- --------- ----- --- + -- -------
:OO R-
-0.05 ----- -- ----- ----- ---- I- ------------ -I-------. ... .
S 0 1 5 . .. . --.. -. ... . .... . - . . .- ....
- --- -+ ------2 R2
~ 0
z -0.25 -+ --- --- ------ --- +---- -------- -------
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Nondmensionaznd Cross Track Error
Figure 5-5: Percentage of the Distance of the Wing Tip Position
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Figure 5-6 shows how far from the origin the cross was when subjects intervened
with the AFF system in hits and Figure 5-7 in false alarms.
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Figure 5-6: Positions of the wing tips at hits (Top) and zoom-in view (Bottom)
All interventions occurred at the left side in both hits and false alarms. Because
the AFF system turns were level, the vertical error was not considered. Mean percent-
age of radial distances bewteen hits and fale alarms was compared, which resulted
in no significant difference at intervention positions between correct and incorrect
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interventions (z = 0.7560, p = 0.225).
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Figure 5-7: Positions of the wing tips at false alarms (Top) and zoom-in view (Bottom)
Two factor 2x2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) test was conducted on the per-
centage of the radial distance for both hits and false alarms. As previously mentioned,
it was assumed that the distance of the wing tip from the origin was influenced by
the two factors, which were the angle of bank and the damping ratio of the AFF con-
troller. Both factors were designed to have two factor levels. The main interest was to
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examine what factors have a significant effect on the human's intervention positions.
In regards to hits, of the main effect, only the damping ratio of the AFF controller
was found to be highly significant (F(1,106)=16.620, p<0.001). However, the angle
of bank and the interaction between two factors had no significance. In the falses
alarms analysis, the damping ratio of the AFF controller was also only significant of
the main effects (F(1,100)=17.011, p<0.001).
5.3 Velocities of the Wing Tip at Interventions
By monitoring the display, the human operator obtained both positional information
and velocities of the wing tip. The following figures show the lateral error of the
wing tip from the origin at the time domain. In Figure 5-8, the lateral error of the
wing tip is plotted on the time domain, and the positions of hits and false alarms are
marked when aircraft banked to 150 and underwent 30*, 600, and 90*. In Figure 5-9,
interventions at scenario 3 and 4 are presented.
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Figure 5-8: Positions of Interventions in Scenario 1 (Top) and 2 (Bottom)
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The shaded area with different colors specified the AFF heading angle change
corresponding to those colors. When the aircraft banked to 15* in scenario 1 and
2, the shaded time intervals with red, green and yellow represent 30*, 60* and 900
heading changes. In scenario 3 and 4, 60*, 120* and 1800 heading changes occurred
during the the shaded time intervals with red, green and yellow.
The cross (+) and the circle (o) represent hits and false alarms respectively. Ve-
locities of the wing tip at interventions are the first time-derivative of the position
so they can be derived from these plots. Graphically, the slope at the time domain
represents the velocity at that point. For every intervention, the numerical differen-
tiation method was used to find the velocity. These velocities of the wing tip were
depicted together with positions of interventions for both hits and false alarms. The
magnitude and the direction of arrows in Figure 5-10 show the velocity vector of the
wing tip at that position.
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Figure 5-9: Positions of Interventions in Scenario 3 (Top) and 4 (Bottom)
According to the Figure 5-10, when humans made correct decisions, velocities
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Figure 5-10: Velocity of Hits (Top) and False Alarms (Bottom)
of the wing tip was generally higher than for false alarms. There was a significant
difference of velocities between hits and false alarms (z = 9.878, p < 0.000). It was
observed that most false alarm interventions had negative velocities, which means the
wing tip was moving toward the outside of the vortex area.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
This chapter discusses the results described in Chapter 5 in detail and also examines
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4. This chapter consists of two main areas:
human's intervention performance during the display-monitoring and trust in the
AFF system.
6.1 Intervention Performance
Misses
The first performance metric examined was the number of misses for each experi-
mental scenario and as presented earlier, four experimental scenarios were provided.
Scenario 1 represented the formation flight where turns were triggered by 150 angle
of bank and station keeping was controlled by the oscillating controller (0.1 damping
ratio). Scenario 2 was combination of turns at 150 angle of bank and the smoothing
controller (0.7 damping ratio). Turns in both scenario 3 and 4 were generated by 250
angle of bank, but the oscillating controller was used in scenario 3 and the smoothing
controller in scenario 4.
Among the four decisions made by the pilot, which are misses, hits, false alarms
and correct rejections, misses are the most crucial decisions within the framework
of safety because missing interventions in the face of extreme situations significantly
threatens safety of the AFF system.
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The result of this investigation by the Friedman test suggests the previous hy-
pothesis that there is a significant difference of the number of misses between factor
levels i.e. operational parameters, is correct. The subjects performed less misses
with the smoothing controller when the AFF banked at 150. Level turns with a low
angle of bank during the AFF moderately introduced the heading angle rate and
the smoothing controller corrected back the position of the wing tip to the reference
without oscillation. In this respect, the human correctly detects through the display
how dynamically the AFF turns and how oscillating the wing tip is by the controller.
This implies the human's intervention accuracy can be improved at the low angle of
bank and with the smoothing controller.
False Alarms
In a similar way to misses, Friedman test and post-hoc pairwise comparisons were
carried out to examine the effect of the factor levels on the number of false alarms.
Subjects executed the most false alarms in scenario 3 where the AFF was operated
with the oscillating controller and the bank angle was allowed to 250 (Figure 5-2).
This result suggests that decision-makers are less trusting when the angle of bank
is high and the position that they are observing oscillates. Operators perceive that
an oscillating controller is more unstable and the 25' angle of bank generates more
dynamic turns.
Subject interventions appearted to have the same tendency under both correct
and incorrect decisions. From the wing tip positions at the moment of interventions,
it is inferred how human operators built the decision-rules in their mental model.
Early interventions in scenarios 1 and 3 were executed because of oscillation of the
cross, and the low trust level in the AFF system. On the contrary, in scenarios 2 and
4, the smoothing controller seems to be stable and comfortable so the human is able
to wait longer to execute the interventions. That means the smoothing controller
increases the trust level in the AFF system, however, sometimes incorrectly.
Poor Performance
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Poor performances includes both incorrect decisions: misses and false alarms. In or-
der to understand the human's comprehensive intervention performance, it is worth
studying the effect of factors on the poor performance. As done in the analysis
of misses and false alarms above, the Friedman test and Friedman multiple pairwise
tests were applied. In scenario 3, the participants exhibited the poorest performances,
which is similar to the result from the analysis of false alarms. It is likely that the
false alarm counts dominated the poor performance metric.
The decision-makers tended to be disturbed by sharp turns generated by the
high bank angle, but the levels of oscillation did not comprehensively influence on the
decision-making to intervene the AFF system. Because the display was designed with
3D vortex tunnels created by the leading aircraft, the pilot in the trailing aircraft is
able to perceive how sharply the AFF turns in the current and future state. Observing
the leading aircraft in a high bank angle, subjects were conservative, which frequently
triggered unnecessary interventions.
6.2 Decision Heuristics
Among the four types of decisions during the display monitoring, interventions in-
cluded hits and false alarms: hits imply necessary interventions, and false alarms
are unnecessary ones. Locations of the wing tip at the moment of interventions
were measured because these locations conveyed information about how early or late
the human executed the interventions in the AFF system. As long as the wing tip
predictably stays inside the vortex area, the human can rely upon the automation.
When the wing tip was close to the boundary of the vortex area or was on the verge
of passing out of the boundary, the human tended to execute the interventions. From
the graphical representation of locations of the wing tip in Figure 5-6 and 5-7, it
appeared that subjects, as trailing aircraft pilots, intervened with the AFF system
only when the wing tip approached the left boundary of the vortex area. Regardless
of correctness of the decisions and scenarios, most interventions occurred at a specific
location.
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Subjects appeared to form their own decision rules during the interaction with
the AFF system, which means they had a mental threshold to decide to intervene.
In hits, 100 hits out of total 110 hits occured between the vortex boundary and
83.5% of radial distance from the origin. Similarly, 94 false alarms out of total 105
false alarms were made between the vortex boundary and 84.5% of radial distance
from the origin (Figure 6-1). This result supports the post-hoc anaysis that subjects
had indistinguishable thresholds for interventions in both hits and false alarms. In
addition to the graphical representation, mean percentages of radial distances of hits
and false alarms were compared to examine the difference statistically. They were
found to be not significantly different when a is 0.05 (z = 0.7560, p = 0.225). In
conclusion, regardless of decision accuracy, positions of interventions were the same.
Figure 6-1 shows locations of interventions and a threshold that is estabilished in
their mental model.
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Figure 6-1: Position of Interventions and Mental Threshold
In section 5.3, it was obvious that velocities of the wing tip were significantly
different between hits and false alarms. This fact demonstrates that subjects were
unable to observe the velocity of the wing tip while monitoring the station-keeping
display. One reason to provide velocity feedback to human operators is that human
operators are not manually flying but monitoring the system in the context of human
supervisory control. In order to obtain the velocity feedback of the wing tip in
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the display, subjects needed to derive velocity from the moving cross with respect
to the moving vortex tunnel. However, subjects interacted with the AFF system
intermittently as a supervisor, so they monitored the display discretely. This occurred
because of the secondary task, which was checking the distance between the leading
and trailing aircraft. Because of the secondary task, the subjects could not fixate their
eyes on the station-keeping display during the flight. By simultaneously monitoring
the display and checking the distance, humans appeared to make decisions to intervene
based on the positions of the wing tip under the time-critical situation. Therefore,
humans failed to obtain the velocity feedback from the display. Figure 6-2 indicates
the phase plane plots of both hits and false alarms.
Phas Plan. Plot of Hits Phase Plane Plot of Fase Alums
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Figure 6-2: Phase plane plots of hits (Left) and false alarms (Right)
In this phase plane plot, lateral error and later error rate of the wing tip were
represented in both interventions. As mentioned previously, positions of the wing
tip at interventions did not show a large difference while velocities of the wing tip
across two interventions were significantly different. When subjects made false alarms,
magnitude of the wing tip velocity was remarkably low, indicating that the system
was correcting but this was not effectively communicated to the operator. Based on
the experimental results, Figure 6-3 shows the decision-making process to intervene
in the AFF system.
The blue arrow shows the typical process when humans normally observe the po-
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Figure 6-3: Decision-making process to intervene with the AFF system
sition and velocity of the wing tip. Once positions and velocities of the wing tip are
observed on the display, humans make decisions to intervene based on their mental
models. Mental models, a individual human's mental understanding of how a system
works, guide interaction with the system. Mental models are not necessarily accurate
and will be constrained by the user's knowledge background, previous experience with
similar systems and operational conditions during interactions with systems. A men-
tal model of functionality of the AFF system was formulated through the practice sce-
nario which was provided before the experimental scenarios. Monitoring the practice
scenario, subjects recognized how the AFF system works for keeping-station. During
the practice scenario, subjects developed their own heuristics to execute interven-
tions. Comparing the heuristics with the observed information, subjects determined
whether or not they should execute interventions. However, when the secondary task
was included in the monitoring task, subjects appeared to skip the need for velocity
information and move directly to the decision point. The red arrows in Figure 6-3
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shows this process.
In this display design, velocity, represented by a yellow block arrow, was not pro-
vided explicitly so humans needed to cognitively derive the velocity. This emphasizes
that the display as designed may not be helpful to support decision-making because it
provided prediction and velocity feedback with pictorial realism. However, the human
operator cannot monitor continuously so discrete monitoring of the display did not
help to obtain the velocity feedback. In this respect, the magnitude of the velocity
is required to be shown explicitly with the position of the wing tip. This experiment
shows that the velocity feedback through the motions of the vortex area and the cross
appears to be ineffective even with a naturalistic display. Thus, a display with the
velocity vector should be equally effective in human's performance.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of the experiments and presents the main findings
from the study. Recommendations for future works are also included.
7.1 Overview of Study
As automation technologies advance, machines are replacing humans by performing
functions that have been performed only by humans. Thus, humans supervise an
automatic system by intervening with the system intermittently. One human-machine
system of the future in the aeronautic field is autonomous formation flight because it
reduces operating costs by decreasing fuel consumption. This technology also has a
variety of applications from cargo aircraft to UAVs. Because humans cannot perform
manual formation flight for a long time, humans are needed as system supervisors.
This study attempted to answer questions as to how human operators correctly
intervened with an AFF system and what information influences human operators
during monitoring of the station-keeping display. This study attempted to discover
what operational conditions minimize incorrect decisions and how they affect the
human's trust level in the AFF system. As independent variables, two operational
parameters were selected: the limit of the angle of bank and the damping ratio of the
AFF controller. Each independent variable had two factor levels, which provided the
basis for four experimental scenarios. Incorrect decisions, misses and false alarms,
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were counted in each scenarios and the position and the velocity of the wing tip were
measured when subjects intervened with the AFF system. 20 subjects participated
in this study.
7.2 Summary of Findings
In the analysis of intervention performances, subjects made the most incorrect inter-
ventions when the AFF was operated with the oscillating controller and high angle of
bank. This was seen commonly in the study of misses, false alarms and poor perfor-
mances. Because the high angle of bank generated sharp turns and the low damping
ratio controller corrected the wing tip with high oscillation, two objects, the vortex
area and the wing tip, were moving and required more cognitive processes to make
decisions. The angle of bank had the strongest effect on poor performances rather
than the damping ration of the controller.
One aspect of trust in the AFF system was investigated and this study showed that
there exists an effect of damping ratio on trust of humans in the AFF system. When
the AFF controller had high damping ratio and the cross moved smoothly, humans
tended to intervene late and waited a longer time. This means the human mentally
had a larger buffer zone in which to execute the interventions and the smoothing
controller seemed to increase the trust level in the AFF system.
One of the main findings in this research is that humans developed biased decision
rules when execute interventions while monitoring the AFF station-keeping display
because velocity feedback was not adequately provided. The decision criteria were
indistinguishable between incorrect and correct decisions, and it appeared that hu-
mans developed a mental threshold to intervene based on the position of the wing tip.
Subjects sometimes failed to obtain the velocity feedback from the display, because
they were out of the control loop and intermittently intervened with the automated
system because they could not continuously monitor one display. An explicit velocity
vector needs to be displayed to improve the human's intervention performance.
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7.3 Recommendations for Future Works
Followings are recommendations for future works.
" This study just utilized a three-dimensional display for experiments and did
not attempt to compare the effectiveness between different types of displays.
Therefore, extension to the study of a two-dimensional display is required in
future work.
* In the display used in this study, the position of the wing tip was given and
a velocity vector was not included. The results showed that pictorial realism
of the display did not support velocity feedback. As discussed earlier, under
intermittent human supervisory control, velocity feedback from the display was
difficult to obtain. A newly designed display should provide the velocity vector
explicitly and the experiments should be extended to measure the effectiveness
of the new display.
" The ultimate goal of the AFF is to reduce the operation cost by using aerody-
namic benefits. It will be valuable to research the cost of the incorrect interven-
tions, which are defined by misses and false alarms. They negates the benefits
from fuel savings so the cost analysis of incorrect interventions will help to build
the cost optimization function for the AFF system. The cost of the AFF system
could be a dependent variable to evaluate the effectiveness of display.
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Appendix A
Statistical Methods
A.1 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance)
The basic model in the ANOVA for the percentage of the radial distance of the wing
tip is shown by the following equation.
Yijk = p + ai -+-# + Jai + Cijk (A.1)
Ytjk is the percentage of the radial distance of the wing tip when the kth subject
underwent the AFF from the angle of bank group i and the damping ratio group j.
pj, is the common effect, a is the effect of the ith angle of bank, and 3 is the effect
of the jth damping ratio. a 3 ij is the interaction between factors a and #, and eggk is
the uncontrolled variation for this specific subject. In this experiment, a and 3 are
fixed effects. The first null hypothesis is that the effects of two bank angles were the
same.
Ho, : ai = a2 (A.2)
The second hull hypothesis is that the effects of two damping ratios were the same.
Ho, :,#1 = #2 (A.3)
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The main interest is to show that these null hypotheses can be rejected at a significant
confidence level. For the two factor ANOVA test, the following sum of squares (SS),
mean squares (MS), degrees of freedoms (DF) and computed F (F) needed to be
calculated.
Source SS DF MS
a a b n
a= SSa __=__i=1 __=1 _k=1 a-1 M Sa = SSabn abn a DF
b a b n 2
S SSa =1 i - = = = b-1 MS'a = SSO
an ab DF
a b a
SSa = bSSa
a'3 n bn 2 (a-1)(b-1) MSa3  DF
_j=1 i1 i=1 k=1
an abn SSE
Error SSE =(SST - SSai - SSO - SSapo) ab(n-1) MSE=
a b n
a b n yijk
Total SST = (T y - - abn-1
i=1 j=1 k=1
Table A.1: ANOVA table for two factor factorial model with n replications of each
combination. n=1, a=2 and b=2 for this experimnet
With the above calculation, the test statistic could be found for each effect and
interaction.
= MSa
MSE
= MS/3
MSE
(A.4)
(A.5)
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A MSa3
F- MSE (A.6)
The ANOVA calculations were done for hits and false alarms using SPSS and shown
in following figures.
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DISTANCE
Type lI Sum
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 628.081a 3 209.360 6.298 .001
Intercept 911301.316 1 911301.316 27414.220 .000
AOB 54.295 1 54.295 1.633 .204
DAMPING 552.169 1 552.169 16.611 .000
AOB' DAMPING 23.781 1 23.781 .715 .400
Error 3556.885 107 33.242
Total 930122.300 111
Corrected Total 4184.967 110
a. R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .126)
Figure A-1: ANOVA table of percentage of distance in hits
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DISTANCE
Type IlIl Sum
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 283.7178 2 141.858 5.175 .008
Intercept 614200.607 1 614200.607 22405.917 .000
AOB 6.820 1 6.820 .249 .619
DAMPING 134.392 1 134.392 4.903 .030
AOB* DAMPING .000 0 . .
Error 1973.695 72 27.412
Total 626211.340 75
Corrected Total 2257.411 74
a. R Squared = .126 (Adjusted R Squared = .101)
Figure A-2: ANOVA table of percentage of distance in false alarms
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A.2 Friedman Test
Friedman (1973) has provided a test statistic ^ 2 to test the null hypothesis that there
is no treatment effect in a randomized block design with k treatments and n blocks,
or simply , the k columns originated in the same population [21]:
xi = 1 R - 3n(k + 1) (A.7)
nk(k + 1
where n is of rows (individuals, replications, sample groups, blocks) and k is the
number of columns (conditions, treatments, types, factors). The test statistic 2 is
distributed like X2 for k-1 degrees of freedom if the samples are not too small. Ties
within a row (i.e., equal data or mean ranks) are, strictly speaking, not allowed; the
computation then follows Victor (1972):
fir n n k3- [ (j ti) l (A.8)
i=1 j=1
with ri the number of ties within the ith row of the ith block and tiy the multiplicity
of the jth tie in the ith block.
Form this statistic and degree of freedom, it is conclude whether there are con-
siderable differences among treatments. Following figures show the computation by
SPSS.
Test Statistic# Test StatisticO
N 20
Chi-Square 9.111
p 3
Asymp. Sig. .028
a. Friedman Test a. Friedman Test
Figure A-3: Table of Friedman test in hits (left) and false alarms (right)
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N 20
Chi-Square F 8.718
df 3
Asymp. Sig. .033
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